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Abstract:  
 
In this article I examine the concept of exemplary damages. Unlike many other studies this paper 
omits policy reasons and focuses primarily on the very concept of exemplary damages. My aim is thus 
not to argue for or against this remedy but rather to show whether or not it is a coherent and genuine 
legal category. Following relevant case law I will develop a conceptual definition of exemplary 
damages under English law of tort. This, I argue, is subject to three types of critical arguments – an 
argument from insufficiency, from positive exclusivity and from negative exclusivity – that highlight 
its incoherence. With respect to problematic aspects of the concept I compare exemplary damages under 
English law to germane Czech law which helps to show the relevance of ontology to law of damages. 
I suggest that from certain ontological perspective, we can reinterpret exemplary damages in a more 
coherent and acceptable manner. I conclude that such an understanding of exemplary damages makes 
them immune to the previous critique and also to the objection of ‘ordre public’ in private 
international law.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Exemplary damages are considered to be one of the most controversial areas of tort law. 
There are many different comments on how to understand them both in common law as 
well as in academic literature, so it is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile these 
views into one coherent category. However, it is widely recognized that exemplary damages 
are established as a distinctive remedy. Recent developments in common law (vindicatory 
damages)1 and statutory regulation (Crime and Courts Act 2013)2 have led to a renewed 
interest in the unification of tort law doctrine, particularly in a principled approach to the 
concept of exemplary damages. 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether there is a genuine framework behind the 
concept of exemplary damages under English law of damages, or if it is just a fictional 
notion. I will therefore begin with positive law and develop a core definition of exemplary 
damages. Then, I will go on to confront this definition with three elementary objections 
(argument from insufficiency, and arguments from positive and negative exclusivity). I will 
argue that all these counter-arguments are based on correlativity between the tort and 
remedy in question and that exemplary damages are, according to the core definition, 
lacking such a feature. Further, I will compare English and Czech law of damages. This 
allows me to highlight some theoretical underpinnings that affect the basic structure of 
damages. In the last part, these considerations will be crucial for a suggested reformulation 
of the exemplary damages definition. 
 
This paper attempts to show that current understanding of exemplary damages under 
English common law is, at least at a conceptual level, highly problematic and that it is 
important to reinterpret this concept as a type of compensatory remedy in order to retain its 
coherence and normativity. However controversial this might appear, it is a strictly 
doctrinal and conceptual approach that is not bound with any policy reasons and thus it in 
principle provides general availability and enforceability of exemplary awards in other 
European countries. It is also worth noting that the author is not concerned here with 
American conception of exemplary (punitive) damages. 
 
2. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES – A DEFINITION 
Exemplary damages can briefly be described as a type of damages that are contrary to the 
basic principle of damages, ie compensation. In contrast to compensatory damages, they 
seek to punish and deter a defendant but not to compensate the loss. Exemplary damages are 
awarded for the most outrageous conduct of the defendant where he acts with a reckless 
disregard of the plaintiff's rights3 and where his behaviour is so unacceptable or even 
shocking that the court must show its disapproval of it.4 
 
At first glance, the idea of punishment clearly belongs to the domain of criminal law. In tort 
law we consider any sort of punishment as an anomalous method of correction. However, 
                                                 
1 Vindicatory damages are a new type of damages that are designed to vindicate the claimants violated rights. 
They have only recently started being awarded as a sum of money that recovers the mere fact of violation of 
some basic right of the claimant. In this sense, vindicatory damages might seem to be similar to exemplary 
damages since they probably do not recover any material loss and thus are extra-compensatory. 
2 In the last year the British Parliament enacted the Crime and Courts Act 2013 that explicitly deals with 
exemplary damages although they had traditionally been part of common as opposed to statute law.  
3 See eg Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome and another [1972] 1 All ER 801, 803, 821; Drane v Evangelou and others 
[1978] 2 All ER 437, 438. 
4 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1228; Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome and another [1971] 2 All ER 187, 198. 
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this was not so obvious in the past.5 In Roman law, the concepts of tort and crime felt under 
a single type of obligation (delictum). In essence, delictum could be characterised as a 
voluntary act of an injury. Roman law then distinguished between public and private 
injuries (delicta publica and delicta privata) depending on whether it was public or private 
legal interest that was injured by a wrongful act. As a consequence of delictum the aggrieved 
party was entitled to perform personal revenge and punish the wrongdoer. After some time, 
the wrongdoer was enabled to repay himself from the threat of this punishment by an 
agreed amount of money that was acceptable for the aggrieved party, although it is worth 
noting that this figure was primarily in no relation to suffered loss and that the wrongdoer 
was basically at the hands of the victim.6 This right of punishment then developed into a 
specific form of claim (actiones poenales)7 which enabled the claimant to sue for a fine (poena), 
ie for monetary punishment. In general, this award was based on the type of injury 
committed and, in the case of interference with proprietary rights of the claimant, on the 
claimant’s material loss multiplied by some number.8 
 
Probably the most important step towards modern law of damages comes with recognition 
of liability in negligence and even more with the concept of strict liability where a subjective 
requirement of a voluntary act that the wrongdoer could be held liable for is missing.9 
Although the defendant could not be punished for his conduct, he still could be responsible 
for damage he caused. 
 
Another important factor was an increasing role of public institutions. According to the 
theory of social contract it is perfectly rational for every citizen to delegate many of his 
rights to some public body (entity) and thus legitimize its power. In this sense, the criminal 
justice system clearly illustrates that it would be very problematic if in every single case of 
injury we were all allowed to perform a private retribution. Hence, from the individual’s 
perspective, we should rather seek for balance in terms of compensation that also better 
complies with any private type of injury (delicta privata) since the damage caused by the 
defendant interferes usually only with private proprietary rights. In short, we can say that 
tort law damages are now therefore linked with occurrence of damage caused by the 
wrongdoer, and their aim is to compensate this damage, whereas the criminal system 
penalizes certain types of wilful conduct that interferes with public interests and its aim is to 
mark social disagreement with it. 
 
However, because any sort of punishment represents the most intensive violation of one’s 
personal rights, there is the need for strict and clear conditions under which it is possible to 
impose it. Criminal law fulfils these requirements through basic principles such as nulla 
poena sine lege or nullum crimen sine lege.10 Similarly, in tort law, it is important to define and 
follow some limits that protect a defendant from unjustifiable punishment, and it is 
undoubtedly the House of Lords’ decision in Rookes v Barnard11 that draws these limits in the 
first place. Lord Devlin defines here three categories of cases where it is, in principle, 
                                                 
5 See Harvey McGregor, ‘Compensation versus Punishment in Damages Awards’ (1965) 28 Modern L Rev 
629, 629; Gerhard Wagner, ‘Punitive Damages in European Private Law’ in Klaus J Hopt, Jürgen Basedow 
and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Handbook of European Private Law (forthcoming), 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1766113> accessed 1.6.2013, 2. 
6 David Elischer, ‘Ke genezi a vyvoji konceptu individualií obcanskopravni odpovednosti za skodu’ in Vlastimil 
Pihera and Bohumil Havel (ed), Soukrome pravo na ceste (Ales Cenek 2010) 121. 
7 cf Wagner (n 5) 2. 
8 Elischer (n 6) 123; see also James Gordley, ‘The Structure of the Modern Civil and Common Law of Torts’ in 
J Gordley (ed), Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2006) 163. 
9 cf McGregor (n 5) 629. 
10 See eg Jerome Hall, ‘Nulla Poena Sine Lege’ (1937) 47 Yale LJ 165. 
11 [1964] AC 1129. 
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possible to punish the defendant by means of exemplary damages. These categories are: (1) 
‘oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government’12; (2) 
torts where ‘the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself 
which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff’13; and (3) cases where 
‘exemplary damages are expressly authorised by statute’.14 This is sometimes called ‘the 
categories test’15 and in principle it could be applied to any wrongful conduct. 
 
Based on a different understanding of Rookes v Barnard16 it had not been clear until 2001 
whether or not it was only ‘the categories test’ or also ‘the cause of action test’ that Lord 
Devlin had established in his speech. The cause of action test, according to which it was 
possible to award exemplary damages only for those claims where the cause of action 
corresponded with the claims for which exemplary damages had been awarded before 1964, 
ie before Rookes v Barnard,17 was first advocated by the Court of Appeal.18 Nonetheless, a 
few years later, when this question was assessed by the House of Lords in Kuddus v Chief 
Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, the cause of action test has been clearly rejected.19 
This was, I believe, a correct step that re-affirmed a principled juristic approach to damages. 
Exemplary damages must therefore again be seen as a normative (as opposed to descriptive) 
concept. The concept itself should structure the court’s reasoning and instruct the judge on 
how to award this type of damages and not vice versa. Moreover, it also implies that 
exemplary damages must in principle be a logically possible and coherent concept. 
Otherwise there would be nothing to follow, ie it would have no normative function and this 
construct would be mere fiction. It follows that we need to examine the category of 
exemplary damages not only through case law, but also at a conceptual level. Thus, I will 
now turn to some other crucial characteristics of exemplary damages from which I will 
develop a basic definition of this legal instrument. 
 
In order to award exemplary damages there are at least another four restrictions that need 
to be fulfilled. Therefore, not only must the defendant’s conduct fall within one of Lord 
Devlin’s three categories, it must also be a case where first, the total sum awarded in 
compensatory and aggravated damages is not adequate to punish the defendant.20 In other 
words, it is insufficient to teach the defendant that tort does not pay.21 Hence, for example, 
in the case of Watkins v Home Office and others,22 the House of Lords refused to award 
exemplary damages where the claimant had not suffered any damage. The House of Lords 
argued that it is impossible to establish whether or not compensation payable to the plaintiff 
is insufficient to punish the defendant if there are no compensatory damages at all. Second, 
the plaintiff must be the victim of the wrongful conduct;23 so, in Ashley v Chief Constable of 
Sussex Police24 the House of Lords refused to award any extra-compensatory damages 
(including exemplary damages) to the plaintiffs who were relatives of the victim.25 Third, 
given that a civil proceeding does not protect the defendant with the same procedural 
                                                 
12 ibid 1226. 
13 ibid 1226. 
14 ibid 1227. 
15 See eg Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] 3 All ER 193, 217. 
16 [1964] AC 1129. 
17 ibid. 
18 AB v South-West Water Services Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 609. 
19 [2001] 3 All ER 193. 
20 [1964] AC 1129, 1227f. 
21 [1964] AC 1129, 1227 or Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome and another [1972] 1 All ER 801, 826, 874, 875. 
22 [2006] UKHL 17. 
23 [1964] AC 1129, 1227. 
24 [2008] 1 AC 962. 
25 ibid 975, 979. 
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safeguards as the criminal justice system, a total sum awarded in exemplary damages should 
not exceed possible punishment for similar criminal conduct.26 When determining this 
figure, the court must be cautious and never abuse its powers. In this sense, there is a clear 
guidance for the assessment of exemplary damages, at least for the first Lord Devlin’s 
category in the case of Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis27 that makes these 
awards more predictable and therefore helps to prevent the defendant from any 
arbitrariness. Finally, according to the fourth important consideration, unlike in 
compensatory damages, wealth of the defendant plays a fundamental role here. As Lord 
Devlin puts it, ‘[e]verything which aggravates or mitigates the defendant's conduct is 
relevant’.28 In accordance with this principle only £1,000 damages were awarded in an 
unlawful eviction case where the defendant was a natural person,29 whereas in case of 
commercial law, the defendant, a corporate legal entity was punished by £60,000 in 
exemplary damages.30 
 
All these limitations including the categories test should be understood as constitutive 
elements of a core definition of exemplary damages. By the core definition I mean such a 
normative structure that every competent person would accept and that could usually be 
followed simply by understanding, ie with no need for interpretation.31 In this sense we can 
say that a vast majority of cases converges to the following normative definition of 
exemplary damages that helps judges to decide when and how to use this form of 
punishment: 
 
In order to punish and deter a defendant, but only if32 compensation payable to a victim is 
insufficient to do so, the victim of punishable conduct that falls within one of three 
categories of cases (oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct by the servant of the 
government; conduct that has been calculated by the defendant to make him a profit which 
may well exceed the compensation payable to the victim; exemplary damages are expressly 
authorised by statute) can be awarded exemplary damages in total sum that reasonably 
reflects the defendant’s wealth and other relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
 
Provided that this is a normative concept it then follows that, when defendant’s wrongful 
conduct fits into this definition, he will, as a consequence of this fact, also have a 
corresponding duty to pay some money (in exemplary damages) to the claimant. Otherwise, 
the core definition would either be non-normative, or an award of exemplary damages 
would be completely arbitrary. As we have seen earlier,33 the House of Lord acknowledged 
normative reading of Rookes v Barnard34 therefore it cannot be the first case. But it also 
cannot be the case of absolute arbitrariness as it would not only neglect basic principles of 
justice such as principle of equal treatment or right of fair procedure, but it would also 
                                                 
26 [1964] AC 1129, 1227f. 
27 [1997] 2 All ER 762, 763, 776. 
28 [1964] AC 1129, 1228. 
29 Drane v Evangelou and others [1978] 2 All ER 437. There was no separate figure for compensatory damages 
so it could be argued that exemplary damages were even less than £1,000. 
30 2 Travel Group plc (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2012] CAT 19. 
31 cf HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1957) 71 Harvard L Rev 593; Andrei 
Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Hart Pub 2005) 118. 
32 I do not want to use material implication here (‘if, but only if’ – cf Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1228) 
because it is simply not this type of implication. The fact that compensation is not sufficient to punish the 
defendant does not imply that exemplary damages can be awarded. It is possible that the goal of punishment 
will be reached by some other form of punishment (eg criminal or administrative). The case Archer v Brown 
[1984] 2 All ER 267, 281 or 2 Travel Group plc (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2012] 
CAT 19, [497] illustrates this point clearly. 
33 See Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] 3 All ER 193. 
34 [1964] AC 1129. 
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violate nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege principles that should apply here to 
some extent. In other words, judges cannot simply abuse their powers. Thus, there must be 
some underlying substantive law that gives rise to the exemplary damages claim and to the 
corresponding tortfeasor’s duty.35 
 
However, this could sometimes be very problematic because the core definition consists of 
too many vague terms and categories.36 This, in effect, forces any practicing judge or lawyer 
to use his skill of interpretation as he would otherwise be unable to decide whether the facts 
that he is accessing fall under the core definition or not. This is a very important moment 
because while interpreting, we in fact apply some other rules that tell us how to use our 
concept of exemplary damages. In other words, we use higher-order rules (meta-rules)37 to 
re-shape our former understanding of this concept into some more applicable version of it 
that better helps us to find the answer. 
 
One of these higher-order rules are legal principles.38 It then seems that some of these 
principles speak against the concept of exemplary damages and undermine its function. For 
instance, when we try to interpret exemplary damages as an inherent part of tort law 
damages, we will inevitably come across the principle of compensation that obviously 
clashes with our core definition.39 We may thus either accept the position that compensation 
is not a universal and constitutive principle of damages or it is also possible that exemplary 
damages are not a coherent concept. In the next chapter, I will therefore examine some key 
objections to exemplary damages in respect/relation to the principle of compensation. 
 
Further, it is worth noting that the following analysis will not be concerned with 
arguments of public policy. There are many strong doctrinal arguments against exemplary 
damages;40,41 nonetheless, in its report on Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages 
(1997), the Law Commission concluded that it is rather policy arguments than any 
conclusive theoretical reasoning that speaks for current retention of exemplary damages in 
English law.42 But if we want to evaluate the core definition we cannot simply rely on policy 
                                                 
35 Pursuant to the substantive (as opposed to procedural) understanding of exemplary damages it is apparent 
that current common law terminology is not very accurate. The terms claimant or defendant do not reflect the 
substantive nature of their legal relation but rather just evoke the procedural aspect. This is perfectly in 
accordance with judicial demands but in jurisprudential writings it should usually not be the same. Otherwise, 
it would suggest that exemplary damages are just an arbitrary, discretional and purely procedural remedy 
which is an absurd position. 
36 See also Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome and another [1972] 1 All ER 801, 837f (as per Lord Reid). 
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (GEM Anscombe, PMS Hacker and J Schulte (translation), 
Blackwell 2009). 
38 Principled approach to legal interpretation is now well established and explicitly began in 19/20th century 
jurisprudence when English lawyers started with reception of civil law systematics and rationality [see 
Gordley (n 8) 159]. I am not concerned here with linguistics, logic or any other disciplines that with no doubt 
also affect our interpretation. 
39 See also Jules Coleman, ‘Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections on Method’ in Gerald J 
Postema (ed), Philosophy and the Law of Torts (CUP 2001). 
40 For common law critique see eg Law Commission, ‘Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages’ 
(1997) Law Com No 247; Solene Rowan, ‘Reflections on the Introduction of Punitive Damages for Breach of 
Contract’ (2010) 30 OJLS 495 or Stephen Todd, ‘A New Zealand Perspective on Exemplary Damages’ (2004) 
33 Com L World Rev 255. 
41 For continental critique see eg Helmut Koziol and Vanessa Wilcox (eds), Punitive Damages: Common Law 
and Civil Law Perspectives (Springer-Verlag 2009); Thomas Rouhette, ‘Availability of Punitive Damages in 
Europe: Growing Trend or Nonexistent Concept’ (2007) 74 Def Counsel J 320; Bernhard A Koch, ‘The 
“European Group on Tort Law” and Its “Principles of European Tort Law”’ (2005) 53 Am J Comp L 189 or 
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (Rome II). 
42 Law Commission (n 40) 100ff. 
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reasons as they take the category of exemplary damages to be clear, coherent and given, so 
in fact they are based on a presumption that is never questioned and thus might be false. We 
therefore need to take a step back and look at the critique of this legal instrument at an 
adequate (in this case conceptual) level. It means that we need to examine which part of the 
core definition faces most of the critical arguments and why it is so. 
 
3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
In this section, I will (at the conceptual level) analyse three close-knit arguments against 
exemplary damages.43 First, I will look at the main argument according to which exemplary 
damages are an undeserved and unjustifiable windfall to the plaintiff. I will present this 
objection in form of an argument from absurdity that highlights the weaknesses of the core 
definition. This will also enable me to show how a different legal system (Czech) could face 
it. After this short comparison, I will turn to the two remaining questions, ie I will examine 
whether or not exemplary damages violate the distinction between criminal and tort law 
and whether punishment is a legitimate aim of tort law. 
 
3.1 The Argument from Insufficiency 
The first objection, which I call the argument from insufficiency, deals with the problem of 
justification of an award of money adjudicated by a court to the plaintiff under the heading 
of exemplary damages. The argument itself consists of two parts. The first part states that 
it is fair, just and reasonable to compensate claimant’s damage with an adequate sum of 
money. In principle, damages should put the claimant in the position as if no wrong had 
been committed,44 thus the sum awarded must equal the damage suffered. This reflects an 
intrinsic correlativity between the damage and damages. Pursuant to this assumption, we 
can in principle always critically evaluate whether or not the award was reasonable and 
adequate, and therefore also legitimate. Now, analogically, there needs to be some sufficient 
reason according to which it would be legitimate for the claimant to receive the money in 
exemplary damages. However, since these damages cannot be compensatory, there also 
cannot be the legitimizing fact of correlativity between the defendant’s obligation to pay the 
sum and the claimant’s right to receive it, and although we can provide some reasons in 
favour of exemplary damages, none of them would be sufficient to legitimize the award. 
Hence, the sum of money is a windfall to the plaintiff. 
 
This position rests on the very notion of damages and in its alternative formulation, has a 
form of reductio ad absurdum argument. If we take damages to be a sum of money awarded 
for damage, it seems that exemplary damages are contradictio in adiecto because they cannot 
be awarded for damage; rather, they are adjudicated as a consequence of this damage.45 The 
notion of correlativity or reciprocity expressed here by the respective term ‘for’ is a 
distinctive feature of compensation that is per definitionem excluded from the concept of 
                                                 
43 There are of course many other arguable or controversial aspects, for instance the aim of exemplary 
damages, proportionality of total sum awarded, vicarious liability, multiple plaintiffs/defendants, insurance 
etc.; but I believe it is sufficient to demonstrate my argument only by those three as they in some respect 
illustrate all the important issues. For other counterarguments see eg Richard Mulheron, ‘Exemplary 
Damages and Tort: An International Comparison’ (2000) 2 U Notre Dame Australia L Rev 17 or Law 
Commission (n 40) 94ff. 
44 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Case 25, 39 (as per Lord Blackburn). 
45 Although we can define damages also alternatively, for example as a sum of money awarded for a wrong 
(Basil Markesinis, Simon Deakin and Angus Johnston, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edn, OUP 2012) 
940), or as a sum of money awarded for a violation of a legally recognised interest (eg James Edelman, Gain-
Based Damages (Hart Pub 2002) 5), there is still very clear notion of compensation or correlativity between the 
sum of money and the wrong committed, so the implication here holds. 
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exemplary damages (cf. ‘only if compensation […] is insufficient to do so’).46 However, 
since there is no damage that would be covered exclusively by an exemplary award, there 
also cannot be a sufficient mutual justification of this civil form of sentence. Similarly, 
Zipursky believes that ‘[t]he relational nature of the liability distinguishes [damages] from 
a fine.’47 
 
The fundamental idea of correlativity could be laid out in the following terms. First, there 
needs to be a good reason why the defendant should have a duty to pay, and second, we also 
need to justify why the plaintiff has a correlative right according to which he is entitled to 
receive the payment. Now, as soon as the second requirement is fulfilled, it will make no 
sense to treat exemplary damages as a non-compensatory remedy.48 At the conceptual level, 
the fulfilment of both conditions implies that any punishment is de facto compensation for a 
wrong. Therefore, the only difference between punishment and compensatory damages 
would be in the type of wrong in question or in other words, whether it is public or private 
interest that has been violated.49 Nonetheless, if exemplary damages are to be paid into the 
claimant’s pocket it obviously cannot be the case of public wrong, but only that of private 
wrong. So, we can conclude that exemplary damages do not substantially differ from 
compensatory damages, which is indeed an absurd outcome. 
 
The classic way of legitimizing exemplary damages in legal doctrine50 highlights private 
nature of the wrong committed. It is only the victim who has the right to be punitive and 
therefore it is just to award him the money. According to Hampton, it was the plaintiff’s 
own value that was damaged and it needed to be restored.51 It is the plaintiff who brings the 
claim to the court and who is redressing an injury and not anyone else.52 All these reasons 
seem to support legitimacy of the exemplary award being paid straight to the claimant 
rather than to anyone else. However, we can ask how this conception differs from 
legitimization of any compensatory award. In the end, these arguments are misleading since 
they draw from the idea of correlativity between the violated interest and the duty to pay 
some money. If we appeal to the concept of reciprocity that bears an important notion of 
legitimacy and fairness,53 I can see no reason why we should define the exemplary award as 
purely non-compensatory. 
 
Possibly, we can also defend the core definition by adding a public element into it, ie to 
divert the sum that is awarded to a public fund. The state recovery of these awards would 
probably require a statutory regulation.54 Nonetheless, this solution, that already applies in 
                                                 
46 See the relevant part of the core definition (above). 
47 Benjamin C Zipursky, ‘Philosophy of Private Law’ in JL Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 627. 
48 Similarly also Helmut Koziol, ‘Punitive Damages - A European Perspective’ (2008) 68 La L Rev 741, 752. 
49 cf delicta privata and delicta publica in Roman law (above). 
50 Although we may also justify exemplary damages from the Rawlsian standpoint appealing to a political 
conception of justice it is not my concern here since I want to examine the doctrinal approach; see John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1993) or John Rawls, ‘Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas’ 
(1995) 92 The J of Philosophy 132, 133. 
51 Jean Hampton, ‘Forgivenss, Resentment and Hatred’ in Jeffrie G Murphy and Jean Hampton (eds), 
Forgiveness and Mercy (CUP 1990). 
52 Benjamin C Zipursky, ‘Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption’ (2011) 125 Harv L Rev 1757, 1759. 
53 Arthur Ripstein, ‘Philosophy of Tort law’ in Jules L Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 681, 57. 
54 Jane Mallor and Barry Roberts, ‘Punitive Damages: On the Path to A Principled Approach?’ (1999) 50 
Hastings Law Journal 1001, 1006. 
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the USA55 to some extent and is also proposed to become part of French civil law,56 gives us 
no good explanation as for why we should award exemplary damages within civil rather 
than criminal trial. Moreover, if we accept this approach, it would actually bring us more 
trouble as it would violate some basic criminal law principles expressed by a number of 
procedural safeguards (although they should systematically apply to exemplary damages 
awards as well). This is because if exemplary damages are to be diverted to a public fund 
and if they are to be strictly punitive (per definitionem) they will in practically no respect 
differ from a criminal sentence.57 Thus, again, the argument from insufficiency remains 
valid. 
 
However, there are three more ways that can resolve the issue at hand. In the first place, we 
may point out that in tort law there are also some other types of damages such as 
restitutionary or nominal damages that are not based strictly on compensation.58 In fact, the 
concept of damages is much wider than the argument from insufficiency presupposes and 
thus it fails even on its very first premise. Although this appears to be a strong 
counterclaim, it cannot succeed. Quite contrary, it would lead to an undeserved 
misapprehension. The notion of correlativity, which, as we have seen, was crucial for the 
first premise of the argument from insufficiency, does not necessarily exclude other than 
compensatory types of damages. Hence, it is legitimate to award restitutionary damages for 
the correlative gain59 of the defendant, or nominal damages for a sole injury, ie ijuria sine 
damno (I return to this problem at the end of this section). Both types of these damages are 
based on mutual justification. They are collateral to some value, so in fact they stand in line 
with the premise they were supposed to undermine. 
 
Second, the claim can be made that exemplary damages are just an instrument, ie that we do 
not accept them as a genuine concept, but rather that we accept them as means to an end or, 
maybe even a fiction regardless of its inner coherence.60 Thus we can say that the 
insufficiency problem does not efficiently address our understanding of exemplary damages 
at all. In fact, we would resign on any conceptual consistency. This instrumental approach 
commits us to hold both that we believe that exemplary damages are in fact a non-existent 
                                                 
55 For an interesting analysis of split-recovery schemes see Catherine M Sharkey, ‘Punitive Damages as 
Societal Damages’ (2003) 113 Yale Law Journal 347. However, Sharkey’s concept of societal damages covers 
only particular types of torts – cf ibid 389. 
56 See more in Solene Rowan, ‘Comparative Observations on the Introduction of Punitive Damages in French 
Law’ in John Cartwright, Stefan Vogenauer and Simon Whittaker (eds), Reforming the French law of obligations 
(Hart Pub 2009) 336 or Rowan (n 40) 513-16. 
57 Although the proportionality of an award corresponds to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44) s 164(4) and to 
the principle of equality before the law and the principle of equal impact, it previously might have been in 
contrast to some earlier authorities, cf eg R v Markwick (1953) 37 Cr App R 125: ‘There should be no 
suggestion that there is one law for the rich and one for the poor.’ Thus, the exemplary award might have 
been harsher than any similar criminal sentence. The critique of this practice has still its place as it is hard to 
understand ‘how the means of the claimant can have any real relevance to the amount to be awarded on an 
exemplary basis.’ Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 444. 
58 ibid 4, 411. 
59 I do not want to develop here the conceptual distinction between unjust enrichment and restitutionary 
damages because both of them bear the notion of correlativity. Thus, both of them are legitimate in the same 
sense. Moreover, for judges, who usually do not commit themselves to any theory or any such terminology, it 
does not matter if they assess any amount of money under the heading of unjust enrichment of restitutionary 
damages - see Steve Hedley, ‘Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ in Margaret Halliwell and Steve Hedley 
(eds), The Law of Restitution (Butterworths 2002) 11. This also speaks for a common intellectual frame of these 
concepts. On the other hand, some authorities; eg Borders (UK) Ltd v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2005] EWCA Civ 197 - use their terminology too loosely that they in fact dismiss the distinction between 
exemplary and restitutionary damages. For more see eg R Cunnington, ‘The Border between Compensation, 
Restitution and Punishment’ (2006) 122 LQR 382. 
60 For the theoretical background see eg Mark E Kalderon, Moral fictionalism (OUP 2005) 3-8. 
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concept, and that we accept this concept only because it is very desirable for us to do so. But 
again, this gives us no good explanation as for why the claimant should receive these 
damages. Jeremy Bentham expressed this point very clearly when he claimed that ‘[any] 
fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into every part of the [legal] 
system’.61 Under this instrumentalist approach the substantive law would remain 
unprincipled and unpredictable. Thus, it would be contrary to the reasons exposed in 
Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary62 and therefore also contrary to the 
normative understanding of exemplary damages. To conclude, we still need some better 
response to the argument from insufficiency. 
 
The third possible answer that I want to follow here accepts the need for correlativity in 
any justification of tort law damages. It is clear that the absurdity emerging from the 
insufficiency objection rests on the strict separation between compensatory and punitive 
aims of damages, which, I claim, is only artificial. We cannot draw a clear distinction if in 
reality there is none since we would commit ourselves to the instrumentalist stance that we 
have previously refused. Calabresi makes the point when he argues that the complexity is an 
intrinsic feature of tort law and it makes no sense to strictly separate these aims. He believes 
it should rather be the opposite, ie that we should realize multiplicity of objectives that 
could be reached through exemplary damages including recovery of non-recoverable 
compensatory damages and vindication of wronged rights.63 Although the idea of the 
recovery of non-recoverable damages seems to be very problematic, we can make good 
sense of it. 
 
The fundamental assumption is that it is permissible to recover not only damage (damnum) 
but also an injury (injuria). While the first is generally recoverable by compensatory 
damages, the second is usually not. However, if we want to fulfil the principle of full 
compensation, we have to recognize that even a sole injury regardless of any explicable 
damage (in terms of loss) lowers the position of the claimant. Therefore, we should also 
compensate a mere breach of the claimant’s rights. Subsequently, we should differ between 
compensation as a principle on the one hand, and compensatory damages as a legal remedy 
on the other. The principle of compensation is an organizing element of law and tends to 
put everything into a balanced state. Every slight correlative shift of this balance (caused by 
a wrong) needs to be recovered primarily by means of compensatory damages. Now, the key 
issue is that what will be recoverable by compensatory damages is essentially a matter of 
our ontological and epistemological beliefs. From this perspective, we can say it is mostly 
random historical circumstances that determine what will be included in the concept of 
damages, ie what would be explicable in terms of substantial damages for a real injury 
(damage). 
 
We can conclude that it is coherent to hold different conceptual categories of damages 
pursuant to our ontology or epistemology. However, in this respect, I would claim that 
there are only two elementary options. Based on our philosophical presuppositions, we can 
seek compensation either for real or unreal injury. The current position in English law is 
that real injury can be both material as well as immaterial, and it is recovered by 
compensatory and aggravated damages. An unreal injury (injuria sine damno) does not even 
raise the question of the value of the loss since it is immanent to this concept that there is 
nothing substantial to be measured. The sole injury to private interest can so far be 
                                                 
61 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol 5 (John Bowring ed, W. Tait 1843) 170. 
62 [2001] 3 All ER 193. 
63 Guido Calabresi, ‘The Complexity of Torts - The Case of Punitive Damages’ in SM Madden (ed), Exploring 
Tort Law (CUP 2005) 343-47. 
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recovered only by nominal damages.64 Now, I want to hold that in the same sense that 
criminal punishment recovers a sole injury to public interest, the concept of exemplary 
damages should recover a private unreal injury. The difference between nominal and 
exemplary damages should be analogical to the relation between compensatory and 
aggravated damages. In other words, exemplary damages should express and recover the 
seriousness of the violation of the private interest.65 
 
At this point, we can successfully defend exemplary damages against the argument from 
insufficiency as we already have a sufficient reason for legitimacy of an exemplary award, 
but at the same time we should partially resign on the core definition of exemplary 
damages, in particular on the strict distinction between the principles of compensation and 
punishment. 
 
3.2 A Comparison to Czech Law 
The differences between ontologically various types of wrongs (injuries) and related legal 
remedies can be illustrated by civil law tradition, particularly by damages under Czech law. 
Due to its historical development and political circumstances, Czech law of damages 
originally only applied to material loss. Until 1989, communists following Karl Marx’s 
legacy governed the Czech Republic; it is thus not hard to see that, because of its prevailing 
materialist ontology, the only recoverable injury in terms of damages was material loss.66 
Subsequently, the decline of the communist regime marked the appearance of other 
monetary remedies that could be systematically categorized as damages. It was a monetary 
award for immaterial loss67 under the heading of just satisfaction, and an award for loss of 
future earnings68 under the heading of damages. It is worth noting that positive Czech law 
does not distinguish between different types of damages, thus, in statutory terminology, it is 
only material loss (real damage and loss of future earnings) that falls under the scope of 
damages. Nonetheless, in Czech legal theory,69 it is uncontroversial that both just 
satisfaction and damages (in positive legal terminology) should be conceptually treated as 
part of ‘law of damages’. For the sake of clarity I will use the term compensatory damages 
for the statutory concept of damages, while the term damages shall be appointed to a more 
abstract legal category, ie for the law of damages in general. 
 
In general, Czech law of damages consists of two main parts, compensatory damages and 
just satisfaction, which corresponds to the material versus immaterial loss dichotomy. As to 
the concept of compensatory damages (real damage and loss of future earnings), the 
underlying justification for an award is clear and uncontroversial and it is mostly the same 
as in English law. The interesting point in terms of comparison comes with the Czech 
concept of just satisfaction. 
 
First of all, just satisfaction is not entirely a monetary remedy. Quite contrary, the statutory 
provision says that the court can recover immaterial loss of the claimant in money only if 
                                                 
64 Here I want to omit the category of vindicatory damages since it would make my argument less clear. 
Nonetheless, it does not change the implication of it. I will return to the question of vindicatory damages later. 
65 cf s36(1)(b) Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c.22): ‘[T]he amount must be proportionate to the seriousness of 
the conduct.’  
66 See § 442 odst. 1 zakona c. 40/1964 Sb., obcansky zakonik (Czech Civil Code), version before 1.1.1992: ‘Only 
real damage shall be recovered [...] in money.’ 
67 See § 13 odst. 2 zakona c. 40/1964 Sb., obcansky zakonik (Czech Civil Code), version after 29.3.1990. 
68 See § 442 odst. 1 zakona c. 40/1964 Sb., obcansky zakonik (Czech Civil Code), version after 1.1.1992. 
69 See eg David Elischer, ‘Nove i staronove jevy v deliktnim pravu - vybrane aktualni otazky v pravu 
odpovednosti za skodu’ in Monika Pauknerova (ed), Promeny soukromeho prava (Karolinum 2009) 147f; 
Josef Fiala et al., MERITUM Obcanske pravo (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 247ff. 
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other forms of just satisfaction, such as the judgement itself, seem to be unsatisfactory.70 So, 
if there is no immaterial loss, it would usually be satisfactory to vindicate the claimant’s 
rights simply by declaring that these rights have been infringed, ie the very fact of 
publication of the judicial decision would do justice. In this respect, the non-pecuniary forms 
of Czech legal remedies could be assimilated to the English concept of nominal damages as 
they are also meant not to compensate an injury, but rather just to indicate the mere fact of 
an injury.71 Although, unlike in common law, under Czech legal regulation, every type of 
injury is in principle actionable. It is also worth noting that just satisfaction is strictly 
bound to rights in person, so whereas compensatory damages can for example be awarded 
for the infringement of the claimant’s proprietary rights, just satisfaction applies only to an 
injury to person. 
 
Now, if an injury causes some immaterial loss (harm), the claimant is also entitled to a 
monetary recovery of this harm. The Czech statutory terminology consistently uses the 
term ‘harm’ since it better illustrates the nature of just satisfaction, which is conceptually 
bound not only with the claimant but also with the defendant. We can demonstrate it by 
using the following linguistic examples. A victim suffers harm in a similar sense as he suffers 
loss. However, a wrongdoer can do harm but cannot do loss. From now on, in relation to 
Czech law, I will therefore use the term ‘immaterial harm’ or simply ‘harm’ instead of 
‘immaterial loss’ for the element of an injury that is recoverable in money. The amount of 
money awarded under the heading of ‘just satisfaction’ thus needs to be proportionate not 
only in relation to the immaterial harm suffered (compensation for immaterial loss in 
English law), but also in relation to the defendant and all the relevant circumstances of the 
injury in question.72 So, in principle, the claimant can be awarded a substantial sum of 
money in addition to the compensatory damages and the first compensatory element of just 
satisfaction. 
 
At first glance, this resembles the English concept of exemplary damages, nonetheless it 
might be a huge misapprehension since just satisfaction is not primarily meant to punish the 
defendant; rather, it should vindicate the claimant’s rights. The award of money recovering 
or compensating the harm is thus always legitimate since it is always collateral to it. The 
compensatory element is just and reasonable in relation to immaterial loss and the 
vindicatory element in relation to every aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the 
injury. The aim of vindication is, however, similar to the aim of exemplary damages, ie to 
teach the defendant that he cannot breach other people’s rights. So, in the vast majority of 
cases, it will be sufficient to satisfy the claimant’s injury (apart from his immaterial loss) by 
a sole declaratory judgement (analogically by an award of nominal damages under English 
law), and only in very rare and exceptional cases can the claimant recover more than was 
his loss, both material and immaterial, if the compensatory award for both material and 
immaterial loss and the publication of the judgement would not be sufficient to indicate the 
seriousness of an injury and to fully compensate the immaterial harm.73 
 
To summarize, Czech law of damages comprises of two basic domains that can possibly give 
rise to a monetary remedy – damage and harm. Damage can be described as a material loss, 
                                                 
70 cf § 13 odst. 1, 2 zakona c. 40/1964 Sb., obcansky zakonik (Czech Civil Code). 
71 This goes in hand with the claimant’s right to recover legal costs since, under Czech law, in order to recover 
these costs, it is not necessary to award him any damages. 
72 See more in Karel Elias et al., Obcansky zakonik: velky akademicky komentar (Linde 2008) 156-58. 
73 This approach has been recently acknowledged by the Czech Constitutional Court (the highest judicial 
authority) in its decision: nalez Ustavniho soudu sp. zn. I. US 1586/09, 6.3.2012. On the analysis of this 
decision in relation to exemplary damages see Vaclav Janecek, ‘K pripustnosti sankcni nahrady skody’ (2013) 
Pravní rozhledy 153. 
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it has two elements (real loss; loss of future earnings) and is recovered by compensatory 
damages. Harm can be characterized as an immaterial loss and a sole injury to the personal 
interests of the claimant, and is compensated by just satisfaction. Just satisfaction can take a 
form of a declaratory judgement, or, if insufficient, it can establish the defendant’s duty to 
pay a monetary compensation for the harm. So, paradoxically, since the concept of harm 
includes also an injuria sine damno, Czech law has shifted from purely materialist 
understanding of damage to a much wider and innovative scheme where it is possible to 
reflect and compensate even a mere injury, or in other words to treat its seriousness as a 
material and recoverable element. As a consequence, such an underlying ontology makes 
the award of just satisfaction immune to the argument from insufficiency since there will 
always be a necessary correlative reason for this award. 
 
In comparison to Czech law we can see some interesting similarities between English and 
Czech compensatory damages; further, between aggravated damages and just satisfaction 
for immaterial loss;74 third, between nominal damages and non-monetary form of just 
satisfaction; and finally, between exemplary damages and monetary form of just satisfaction 
for a sole injury. Nonetheless, from the perspective of exemplary damages there is at least 
one important difference, ie that the concept of just satisfaction does not exclude the 
principle of compensation. Moreover, just satisfaction includes the principle of vindication, 
prevention and the principle of punishment. 
 
In his well-argued study, Colby pointed out that exemplary damages historically developed 
from a special form of compensation for a private injury and that the understanding of them 
as a punishment for a private wrong was just an ex-post rationalization of such an award.75 
Hence, it might be arguable whether or not punishment without compensation is a 
legitimate goal of damages. As Lord Hoffmann puts it, the fact that compensatory damages 
can ‘have a punitive, deterrent or exemplary function [has not been controversial]. What 
distinguishes exemplary damages for the purpose of the Rookes v Barnard dichotomy is that 
they do not have a compensatory function.’76 This brings us to the second and third 
elementary objections to exemplary damages dealing with the principle of punishment. 
 
3.3 Positive and Negative Argument from Exclusivity 
Looking at the core definition, we can draw from it that exemplary damages should not bear 
any notion of compensation. As we have shown earlier, this presumption makes it 
impossible to provide any sufficient reason for legitimacy of the award being given to the 
claimant. Now, the same part of our definition is often subject to another criticism that takes 
basically two different forms. I call them positive and negative argument from exclusivity. 
 
The positive argument from exclusivity rests on punishment being an exclusive principle of 
public law since only the state (as a public entity) can legitimately punish its citizens77 and 
because it has more adequate procedural safeguards. Therefore, there is no room for the 
principle of punishment outside the public law domain. It positively states where the 
                                                 
74 Also the Law Commission’s proposal to replace the concept of aggravated damages by a concept of damages 
for mental distress supports this conclusion - cf Law Commission (n 40) 10-27; or from contrary perspective 
Allan Beever, ‘The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages’ (2003) 23 OJLS 87, 90. 
75 Thomas B Colby, ‘Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for 
Individual, Private Wrongs’ (2002) 87 Minn L Rev 583, 613-36. 
76 The Gleaner Co Ltd and Another v Abrahams [2004] 1 AC 628, [41] (per Lord Hoffmann). 
77 There is obviously some contract theory basis in this assumption. 
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principle of punishment belongs to and excludes it as a leading principle from other legal 
disciplines.78 
 
On the other hand, the negative argument from exclusivity says that principles of tort law 
are not mutually exclusive. It is true that various remedies have their respective prevailing 
principles but none of these principles is an exclusive one.79 There are more aims of tort law 
damages such as compensation, deterrence, prevention, punishment, vindication, declaration 
that are complementary and that cannot be fitted into a single compartment. 
 
It might therefore be legitimate to follow the principle of punishment through the civil 
law80 but not as a dominating and sole aim (as it seems to be in case of exemplary damages); 
otherwise we would face many other difficulties such as risk of double punishment etc.81 
Moreover, if we accept that exemplary damages are meant to punish the defendant, we will 
in cases such as Thompson v MPC82 where the defendant is a public body come to another 
absurd conclusion, ie we will allow an individual to punish the public body. This is very 
problematic since it is contrary to the political consensus that only the state or some other 
public entity can legitimately punish its citizens. Although common law judges might not 
have previously consented to the theoretical dichotomy between public and private law or 
to any similar doctrinal approach,83 we should keep in mind that in the context of modern 
law, ‘theoretical coherence [should not be] regarded as, at best, a luxury, and more 
typically an obstacle to achieving [justice]’.84 
 
To conclude, it is now easy to see that all three arguments against exemplary damages 
(from insufficiency; from positive exclusivity and from negative exclusivity) clash primarily 
only with one part of the core definition. Subsequently, I claim that since we cannot provide 
any good response to these objections we should alter the definition. These three arguments 
represent the very basis for any critique of exemplary damages and they also efficiently 
highlight the most problematic feature of this concept, ie complete elimination of the 
compensatory principle. 
 
We have seen that the difference between punishment and compensation is not so clear-cut 
and that it is closely related to our ontological assumptions. From a certain perspective it is 
thus possible to compensate the claimant’s violated rights since they have their own value 
and could be treated as a form of damage.85 Such an ontological understanding of the 
claimant’s rights, although formerly connected only to the concept of nominal damages, has 
been part of English law for a long time. Hence, at this point, in accordance with a coherent 
tort law doctrine, I shall try to incorporate the principle of compensation into the concept of 
exemplary damages. 
 
                                                 
78 cf also Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1221. 
79 See eg Andrew S Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd edn, OUP 2004) 10 and Edelman 
(n 45) 4. 
80 Law Commission (n 40) 94, 99. 
81 See eg AT and others v Dulghieru and another [2009] EWHC 225; Borders (UK) Ltd and others v Commissioner 
of Police of The Metropolis and another [2005] EWCA Civ 197; or Lancashire County Council v Municipal Mutual 
Insurance Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 545, 553. 
82 [1997] 3 WLR 403, 417. 
83 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome and another [1972] 1 All ER 801, 860. 
84 Gerald J Postema, ‘Philosophy of the Common Law’ in JL Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 595. 
85 In similar sense we can understand criminal sentence as compensation for violation of public right(s). See 
also Sharkey (n 55). 
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4. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FROM THE COMPENSATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
However controversial it might appear, if we want exemplary damages to be an inherent 
part of the system of tort law damages, we should understand them as compensation for the 
harm caused by the defendant to the claimant. The idea here is similar to the rationale of 
nominal damages that seem to be damages only by their name since the ontological status of 
damage they are supposed to recover is somewhat puzzling. The judgement for nominal 
damages basically declares that there has been some infringement of the claimant’s right. 
Nonetheless, this alone does not imply that the violated right has also been vindicated. 
 
As we have seen in comparison to Czech law, the infringement is twofold. It can be both 
mere formal interference with the claimant’s protected interest (recoverable by nominal 
damages), as well as material breach of this right. The material element stands for the 
gravity or seriousness of a wrong, and is in relation to the claimant’s private interest, and 
thus needs to be recovered (compensated) based on these factors.86 
 
Unfortunately, there is a slight complication with the recognition of these protected 
interests, since (in respect to nominal damages) not every tort is actionable per se and thus 
recoverable. It is then arbitrary and luck-dependent87 whether any subsequent exemplary 
damages can be awarded. That is clearly against our proclaimed normative approach to 
damages. Quite contrary, exemplary damages should in principle be available for every 
injury. This means that they should also not be limited to the three Lord Devlin’s 
categories.88,89 
 
Now, if we reformulate the core definition in a more coherent way, ie if we omit the 
elimination of compensatory principle, it seems that vindicatory damages can be treated as a 
model type of tort law remedy that consolidates both compensatory and punitive functions. 
Many authors pointed out that vindicatory damages can replace exemplary damages since 
they play exactly the same role.90 Vindicatory damages are, just as nominal damages, so-
called ‘right-based’ remedy since they are in the first place connected to an injury (as 
opposed to damage or gain). So the fundamental idea of correlativity here is bound to the 
seriousness of an injury and the type of right in question. Although the aim of vindication is 
widely recognised in practically all types of damages, it is conceptually usually associated 
only with the breach of constitutional rights.91 Nonetheless, the aim of full vindication that 
cannot be carried out by the current concept of compensatory damages but that is 
essentially related to the injury appears to be instructive. 
 
Moreover, vindicatory or some other extra-compensatory damages seem to be of higher 
legitimacy these days since most judicial decisions do not have sufficient public attention 
                                                 
86 For more on the formal element see eg Ashby v White (1703) 2Ld. Raym. 938, 955 or McGregor et al. (n 57) 
414. 
87 cf Todd (n 40) 268; or Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 88-91. 
88 For more on the same conclusion see Law Commission (n 40) 96. 
89 We can see very similar normative approach in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c.22) s 34(7): ‘Exemplary 
damages may be awarded […] whether or not another remedy is granted.’ 
90 This applies at least to the first Lord Devlin’s category. See eg David Pearce and Roger Halson, ‘Damages 
for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and Vindication’ (2008) 28 OJLS 86; Eddy D Ventose, 
‘Damages for Constitutional Infringements: Compensation and Vindication’ (2010) Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 245; Robert Stevens, ‘Torts, Rights and Losses’ (2006) 122 LQR; or Lord Scott, ‘Damages’ (2007) 4 
LMCLQ. 
91 cf eg Regina (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245, 283; Takitota v Attorney 
General [2009] UKPC 11, 15; Merson v Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38; or Attorney General of Trinidad and 
Tobago v Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15.  
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and thus nominal damages, ie pure declaration, do not fully recover the claimant’s injury. 
On the other hand, I see no reason as for why we should pretend that such a remedy only 
needs to punish the defendant if we can reach the same goal by compensatory interpretation 
of exemplary damages. They can be seen as a sum of money awarded for the seriousness or 
gravity of violated right. 
 
As a result, it seems that exemplary damages (in their current position) are not a genuine 
and coherent normative concept. They might even be seen as a fictional category that 
Jeremy Bentham was so desperately fighting against. It thus seems that in terms of 
exemplary damages, judges do not obey the rules of common law; rather they govern these 
rules,92 which is contrary to the normative approach to exemplary damages established in 
Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary.93 In this context, it is more important 
that these rules and the concepts that are used are transparent, principled and coherent. 
Hence, we should reformulate our core definition in a way that it does not exclude 
compensation and that it is generally applicable to any tort. Exemplary damages under 
English law of tort may thus be possibly expressed in the following terms: 
 
In order to punish and deter a defendant, but only for the harm not recoverable by another 
type of damages, the victim of punishable conduct can be awarded exemplary damages in 
total sum that reasonably reflects the defendant’s wealth and other relevant aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, i.e. recovers and vindicates seriousness or gravity of an injury 
regardless of any material or immaterial loss. 
 
Here, in accordance with the argumentation of this paper, the principle of punishment is 
still legitimate but not an exclusive principle of exemplary damages. Further, exemplary 
damages are not meant to duplicate other remedies (risk of double punishment); rather they 
should be a complementary and inherent part of the system of damages that seek for full 
compensation. On the other hand, the award here is not dependent on any prerequisite, such 
as the least compensation payable in terms of other remedies which actually makes it more 
foreseeable and, in a way, a less exceptional remedy. However, this does not mean that 
every injury is so serious that the claimant can be awarded exemplary damages for it. 
 
The reformulated definition is also immune to the three arguments against exemplary 
damages. Further, it lays out exemplary damages as a type of right-based remedy and thus 
draws a clearer relation to aggravated damages. Finally, it may also bring in better 
enforceability of common law judgements under other European jurisdictions since it can no 
more be contrary to public policy (ordre public).94 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the current study was to determine whether exemplary damages under 
English law are a genuine concept or just an instrumental or fictional category. I have 
argued that it is necessary to establish a coherent and principled understanding of 
exemplary damages because of their normativity. Therefore, I have extracted a core 
definition of this concept and checked it against three basic counterarguments – the 
argument from insufficiency, and arguments from positive and negative exclusivity. In this 
part, the study has shown that it is impossible to face these objections and hold a non-
collateral interpretation of exemplary damages at the same time. 
                                                 
92 Postema (n 84) 589. 
93 [2001] 3 All ER 193. 
94 cf Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), s 32. 
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As a result, I claimed that any justification of the core definition rests on our ontology, ie 
what type of damage are we able to express as recoverable. Compared to the Czech legal 
doctrine, we have seen that it might be possible re-interpret the English concept of 
exemplary damages as a form of compensation for generally non-recoverable harm. In other 
words, the distinction between immaterial loss and a sole injury to the personal interests of 
the claimant as two elements of harm enables us to recover the injury itself. 
 
In the vast majority of cases it will be sufficient to recover or vindicate such an injury by 
nominal damages. However, if the interference with the claimant’s rights will be too serious 
that a mere declaratory award of nominal damages (with some other available remedies) will 
not adequately punish the defendant, it might be desirable to recover this infringement by 
means of exemplary damages. The award here would be collateral to the material element of 
the sole injury and thus still in compliance with the principle of compensation. 
Subsequently, drawing from these assumptions, I have suggested a reformulated definition 
of exemplary damages that appears to be conceptually more coherent. Such an 
interpretation might also affect enforceability of at least English exemplary awards under 
private international law. 
 
Undoubtedly, there are still many questions left. Further research might thus for example 
investigate the ontological basis of the current law of damages or the relation between 
vindicatory and exemplary damages under English law. In the end, it will also be 
interesting to follow the upcoming application of the new British legislation (Crime and 
Courts Act 2013) that explicitly deals with exemplary damages. Since the scope of this paper 
was limited to English and Czech law it seems to be important to analyse the concept of 
damage and damages in other jurisdictions as well. This may lead to some stronger 
implications for the general legal theory. 
 
